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Abstract
This paper aims to study the stability properties of a two-period over-
lapping generations model (OLG) with a progressive labor-income taxa-
tion rule. In this case, wage income tax rates are increasing with agents
income. Each representative agent lives two periods: youth and adult-
hood. In the rst period, agents choose labor supply and allocate their
after-tax income between consumptions and savings (capital accumula-
tions). In the second period, agents are retired and consume entirely
their savings returns. It is shown that progressive labor-income taxation
policy acts as a destabilizing factor in the sense that a higher progressivity
makes the emergence of indeterminacy and endogenous uctuations more
likely. These uctuations appear if the elasticity of capital-labor substi-
tution is su¢ciently low. Moreover, we show that saving rate widens the
range of parameters giving rise to endogenous uctuations. The analytical
ndings are completed by a numerical example.
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1 Introduction
Taxation is an unavoidable tool in contemporary economies used to nance
public expenditures which in turn aim to achieve primary economic and social
objectives. In particular, individual income taxes have been the largest source
for U.S. government since the middle of last century with an average of 8% of
American GDP and it represents about 45% of Federal Tax Revenue in 20081 .
Most OECD countries apply income taxes with progressive features where tax
rate increases as the taxable base amount gets higher. For instance, the average
income tax rate in 2008 ranged from roughly 2.6% of income for the bottom half
of tax returns to about 23.27% for the top 1%2 . Therefore, I think that con-
sidering a progressive taxation policy is a suitable strategy to keep a reasonable
gap between rich and poor agents.
Individual income taxes consist of both labor-income tax and capital-income
tax. However, in this paper, we restrict our attention to a labor-income tax only
with a progressive policy. This is consistent with U.S. tax code where labor-tax
rate is more progressive that capital-tax rate3 .
Our objective is to study the stability e¤ect of labor-income tax progressivity,
in other words, does tax progressivity prevent the emergence of endogenous
uctuations due to self-fullling expectations, or not4?
We propose an overlapping generation model (thereafter, OLG) with two-
period consumption à la Diamond (1965) where in the rst period, young agents
allocate their after-tax wage income between consumption and saving. In the
second period, old agents, who are retired, consume their entire income that
comes from the returns of rst-period saving. Government purchases which are
nanced through agents labor income tax do not contribute to either production
or agents utility.
Since the seminal work of Diamond (1965) and Reichlin (1986), numerous
studies have been extended to include scal policy. More precisely, Dromel and
Pintus (2006) (thereafter D-P (2006)) focus on a non-linear capital-income tax-
ation rule in an OLG model à la Reichlin (1986) where they show that endoge-
nous uctuations are ruled out and saddle-point stability is ensured whenever
tax progressivity is su¢ciently high. Seegmuller (2003) proposes a constant tax
policy together with public services in a similar OLG framework. However,
Chen and Zhang (2009a, 2009b) and Gokan (2009a) consider an endogenous
linear tax jointly with a two-period consumption OLG model. Particularly,
Chen and Zhang (2009a) concentrate on labor-income taxation while Chen and
Zhang (2009b) study the e¤ect of capital-income tax rule on the appearance of
endogenous cycles. They deduce that labor-income tax policy (resp. capital-
income tax policy) operates as a destabilizing factor (resp. stabilizing factor).
1Source: Congressional Budget O¢ce, a preliminary analysis of the presidents budget and
an update of CBOs budget and economic outlook, March 2009.
2For more details, see Summary of Latest Federal Individual Income Tax Data 2010,
Fiscal Facts No. 249, Tax Foundation.
3See Hall and Rabushka (1995).
4 Initially, income taxes have been considered as a stabilizing instrument by Musgrave and
Miller (1948).
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These contradictory results are intuitively explained as labor income taxation
makes consumption-saving ratio smaller for young agents which makes cycles
more likely to emerge.
Comparing to above literature, considering a progressive labor-income tax in
an OLG model is an extension of the work of Chen and Zhang (2009a). At the
same time, this work allows to study the robustness of existing results obtained
by D-P (2006) where they deduce that progressive scal policy has a stabilization
power if taxed income nances all or at least most of consumptions generated
by agents. Hence, rst-period consumption might be a crucial element for the
stability e¤ect of scal rules in an OLG economy5 .
This paper shows that high labor-income tax progressivity performs as a
destabilizing factor in the sense that it promotes endogenous cycles. These
cycles arise due to the presence of interaction of two conicting e¤ects on savings
that operate through wages and real interest rate. The intuition goes as follows:
assume that current capital increases from its stationary level. This implies an
increase in wages and so more capital accumulations. At the same time, agents
expect that an increase in future capital reduces future interest rate. Such an
expectation induces them to supply less labor which in turn has a negative
e¤ect on capital accumulation. Cyclical paths emerge whenever the interest
rate e¤ect dominates the wage e¤ect. This requires a su¢ciently low elasticity
of input substitution together with a high propensity to save out of after-tax
wage income and a high tax progressivity.
Therefore, while taxation policy acts as a destabilizing factor in our model,
it has a stabilizing power in D-P (2006). Such a di¤erence is due to that, in
this paper, taxes are imposed on labor income and agents consume in both
periods. On the contrary, D-P (2006) assume that taxes are imposed on capital
income and agents consume only when they are old. These assumptions are
crucial to give rise to di¤erent results from a stability point of view. In this
study, indeterminacy requires high saving rate which means that a low fraction
of consumptions is nanced by labor income while in D-P (2006) consumptions
are totally nanced by capital income. This conrms their principle conclusion:
if agents consumptions are mostly nanced by wage income (resp. capital
income), then the endogenous uctuations are ruled out if progressive taxes
are applied to labor income (resp. capital income). Likewise, progressive labor-
income tax is not helpful to stabilize both labor and consumptions since second-
period consumption depends strictly on the interest rate.
The stability e¤ects of taxation policies have been studied also in a one-
sector innite horizon representative agent model6 . The pioneering paper of
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) considers a balanced-budget rule with a con-
stant returns-to-scale technology where a constant government spending is -
5See Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004) for the importance of rst-period consumption in OLG
model.
6The role of taxation progressivity is also treated in a heterogeneous agents framework.
For instance, in a segmented agents model à la Woodford (1986), see among others, Dromel
and Pintus (2008) and Lloyd-Braga, Modesto and Seegmuller (2008), however, heterogeneity à
la Becker (1980) is considered by Sarte (1997), Sorger (2002) and Bosi and Seegmuller (2010).
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nanced by xed income taxes. This countercyclical tax policy can generate in-
determinate steady state and a continuum of sunspots equilibria. However, Guo
and Harrison (2004) extend Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe model by allowing endogenous
government expenditures nanced by proportional tax rates on capital and la-
bor incomes. They show that indeterminacy does no longer appear and the
economy exhibits saddle-path stability. Moreover, Guo and Lansing (1998) nd
that introduction a progressive income tax in a model with increasing returns as
in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) can prevent agents self-fullling expectations
and provides a unique equilibrium. More recently, Dromel and Pintus (2007)
consider a linear income-tax policy into the model of Benhabib and Farmer
(1994) where it is assumed that this tax is constant and applied to income only
when the latter is higher than a threshold value. They demonstrate that taxes
can prevent the occurrence of endogenous uctuations. The stabilizing role of
the progressive tax can be interpreted as follows: when agents are optimistic
and expect a higher wage tomorrow and simultaneously they realize to face an
increasing tax rate. This reduces their expected after-tax returns and prevents
the occurrence of self-fullling expectation.
The outline of this paper is the following: Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 characterizes the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 4 demonstrates
the existence of a steady state. The local dynamics is introduced in section 5
followed by a numerical example in section 6 and nally section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a competitive, non monetary, two-period overlapping generations
model with identical agents. In each period t, Nt individuals are born and
live only two periods "young and old". There exists a unique good which can
be either consumed or saved. In the rst period, agents allocate consumption
and saving according to their after-tax income and in the next period they
do not supply labor and consume the entire rst-period saving returns. In
addition, agents are imposed to pay a labor income tax which is supposed to be
progressive.
Given the real wage wt and the gross real interest rate Rt+1, an agent born
at time t  0 choose labor lt, saving st and both period consumptions (ct; dt+1)
to maximize the following additive separable preferences:
max
ct; dt+1, lt
[u (ct=B) + u (dt+1)  v (lt)] (1)
subject to
ct + st = ' (wtlt) (2)
dt+1 = Rt+1st (3)
ct  0, dt+1  0 for all t  0
with ' (wtlt) = wtlt    (wtlt) is the after-tax income and  (wtlt) is the
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amount of tax payment,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and B is a scaling
parameter.
Assumption 1 u (x) is continuous, increasing u0 (x) > 0 and concave
u00 (x) < 0 for x = ct=B; dt+1, while v (l) is continuous for 0 < l <  and
increasing v0 (l) > 0 and convex v00 (l) > 0. Additionally, limx!+1 u
0 (x) = 0,
limx!0+ u
0 (x) = +1, liml!0+ v
0 (l) = 0 and liml! v
0 (l) = +1.
For future reference, we present the following necessary elasticities: the elas-
ticity of marginal utility of current and future consumption "11 = u
00 (x)x=u0 (x) <
0 for x = ct=B; dt+1 and the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor "v =
v00 (lt) lt=v
0 (lt) > 0.
Assumption 2 The function ' (wtlt) 2 C
2 is positive with ' (0) = 0.
Further, it satises 0 < '0 (wtlt)  1, '
00 (wtlt) < 0 for all wtlt > 0. Moreover,
the income tax is a progressive tax, that is, ' (wtlt) =wtlt is non-increasing for
wtlt > 0 or equivalently '
0 (wtlt)wtlt=' (wtlt)  1.
7
The Lagrangian function for household problem is:
Lag = u (ct=B)+ u (dt+1)  v (lt)+t (' (wtlt)  ct   st)+t (Rt+1st   dt+1)
(4)
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct, dt+1, lt and st imply:
Bv0 (lt) = u
0 (ct=B)wt'
0 (wtlt) (5)
v0 (lt) = u
0 (dt+1)Rt+1wt'
0 (wtlt) (6)
Income tax progressivity can be obtained whenever the marginal income
tax rate is higher than the average tax rate. More explicitly, the marginal
tax rate is  0 (wtlt) = 1   '
0 (wtlt) and the average tax rate is  (wtlt) =wtlt =
1 ' (wtlt) =wtlt. Thus, progressive taxation requires marginal rate greater than
average rate, i.e., '0 (wtlt)  ' (wtlt) =wtlt. This scal policy generalizes Chen
and Zhang (2009a) where they suppose an endogenous linear taxation policy.
The corresponding elasticities of after-tax income are:
(1; 2) 

'0 (wl)wl
' (wl)
;
'00 (wl)wl
'0 (wl)

(7)
where 1 2 (0; 1] and 2  0 are respectively the rst-order and the second-
order elasticity of after-tax income with respect to labor income.8
7For details, see among others Dromel and Pintus (2006) and Bosi and Seegmuller (2010).
8 In this paper, tax progressivity is dened in marginal terms as implemented by Musgrave
and Thin (1948).
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2.1 Firms
On the production side, rms which are identical utilize capital Kt and labor
Lt to produce nal goods and to maximize the prot:
t = AF (Kt; Lt) RtKt   wtLt
with F (Kt; Lt) is the production function which has the following features.
Assumption 3 F (K;L) is a continuous function dened on [0;+1), homo-
geneous of degree one, strictly increasing in both arguments (FK (K;L) > 0; FL (K;L) > 0)
and strictly concave (FKK (K;L) < 0; FLL (K;L) < 0).
9 Additionally, F (0; 0) =
0 and the boundary conditions limk!0+ f
0 (k) = +1, limk!+1 f
0 (k) = 0+ are
satised, where f (k)  F (k; 1) is the production per labor and k  K=L is the
capital-labor ratio.
If we set  (k)  f 0 (k) and ! (k) = f (k)  kf 0 (k) we then obtain:
R (k) = A (k) and w (k) = A! (k) (8)
As a result, the elasticity of interest rate k0 (k) = (k) =   (1  s) = < 0
and the elasticity of real wage !0 (k) k=! (k) = s= > 0, with s 2 (0; 1) is the
capital share in total income and  2 (0;+1) is the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution.
2.2 Government
As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), Guo and Lansing (1998) and Bosi and
Seegmuller (2010) labor income taxes are used to nance government expendi-
ture Gt. Hence, the instantaneous government budget constraint is:
Gt = Nt (wtlt) (9)
Notice that public spending does not contribute to either production or
household utility.
3 Intertemporal equilibrium
The number of households at each generation grows at a constant rate n >  1
such that 1 + n = Nt+1=Nt where Nt is the number of population born at time
t. At equilibrium, all markets clears:
1. Capital market clears according to capital-accumulation equation: Ntst =
Kt+1.
2. Labor market clears: Lt = Ntlt.
9Notice that: FL (K;L)  @F (K;L) =@L and FK (K;L)  @F (K;L) =@K. This notation
holds across the paper.
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3. Government spending Gt is determined by the balanced budget rule (9).
4. By Walras law, output market also clears: Nt (ct + st) +Nt 1dt + Gt =
AF (Kt; Lt).
From market clearing conditions, one can easily demonstrate that:
st = kt+1 (1 + n) lt+1 (10)
Substituting (10) and (8) together with conditions (2)-(3) in the rst-order
conditions (5) and (6) yields the following two-dimensional dynamic system of
k and l.
Bv0 (lt) = u
0

' (A! (kt) lt)  kt+1 (1 + n) lt+1
B

A! (kt)'
0 (A! (kt) lt) (11)
v0 (lt) = u
0 [A (kt+1) kt+1 (1 + n) lt+1]A (kt+1)A! (kt)'
0 (A! (kt) lt)(12)
4 The steady state
The steady state of the dynamic system (11)-(12) is a solution (k; l) of the
system:
Bv0 (l) = u0

' (A! (k) l)  k (1 + n) l
B

A! (k)'0 (A! (k) l) (13)
v0 (l) = u0 [A (k) k (1 + n) l]A (k)A! (k)'0 (A! (k) l) (14)
Obviously, there might exists one or multiple steady state for the system
(13)-(14). However, to simplify the analysis, we follow Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga
and Pintus (1998) by showing the existence of a normalized steady state such
that (k; l) = (1; 1) by selecting suitably the scaling parameters A; B > 0.10
Assumption 4 1 + "11 > 0.
This assumption has been made by, among others, Cazzavillan and Pintus
(2004), Bosi and Seegmuller (2008) in order to ensure that consumptions in both
periods and leisure are substitutable goods and saving function is increasing in
the gross rate of return R.
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1   4 be satised, there exists a steady state
of dynamic system (11)-(12) such that k = 1 and l = 1 for one of these cases:
1. If the following su¢cient boundary conditions are satised:
lim
A!A
u0 [A (1) (1 + n)]A (1)A! (1)'0 (A! (1)) < v0 (l) (15)
lim
A!+1
u0 [A (1) (1 + n)]A (1)A! (1)'0 (A! (1)) > v0 (l) (16)
10For simplicity, we concentrate on local dynamics around the normalized steady state
without illustrating the possible existence of other steady state.
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then, 9 A > A  ' 1 (1 + n) =! (1) such that (14) is veried at (k; l) =
(1; 1). However, if at (k; l) = (1; 1), we have 1+"11+2+1 > 0 for all A,
then A is unique (because of the continuity of functions involved in (14),
i.e., the functions fv ; u; F; 'g 2 C2).
2. If the following su¢cient boundary conditions are satised:
lim
A!A
u0 [A (1) (1 + n)]A (1)A! (1)'0 (A! (1)) > v0 (l) (17)
lim
A!+1
u0 [A (1) (1 + n)]A (1)A! (1)'0 (A! (1)) < v0 (l) (18)
then, 9 A > A  ' 1 (1 + n) =! (1) such that (14) is veried at (k; l) =
(1; 1). However, if at (k; l) = (1; 1), we have 1+"11+2+1 < 0 for all A,
then A is unique (because of the continuity of functions involved in (14),
i.e., the functions fv ; u; F; 'g 2 C2).
Moreover, given the value of A, there exists B > 0 which is a unique
solution of (13) at (k; l) = (1; 1).
Proof. See Appendix (A).
Corollary 1 Suppose that the after-tax income function ' (wl) is locally
isoelastic, then the boundary conditions (15)-(16) are su¢cient for the existence
of a unique A > A.
Simply, if ' (wl) has an isoelastic formulation around the steady state, then
one can show that 2 = 1   1. As a result and according to Assumption 4 we
have 1 + "11 + 2 + 1 > 0.
5 Local dynamics
In this section, we study the role of income taxation on the occurrence of endoge-
nous uctuations due to self-fullling prophecies. It is supposed that the after-
tax income function ' (wtlt) is locally isoelastic which provides that 1 = 1+2.
Linearizing the dynamic equation (11)-(12) around the normalized steady state
k = l = 1 yields the following Jacobian matrix J :
J =

"11= (1  ) "11= (1  )
"11   (1  s) (1 + "11) = "11

 1 
Z2 Z1
 s (1 + 2) = "v   2

(19)
with Z1  "11 (1 + 2) = (1  )+2 "v and Z2  s (1 + 2) ("11= (1  ) + 1) =.
The characteristic polynomial of (19) is P () = 2   T+D, where the trace
T = 1 + 2 and the determinant D = 12 are respectively given by:
T =
X1 +X2X3
"11 (1  s) (1 + "11)
> 0 (20)
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D =
s (1 + 2) (1 + "v)
 (1  s) (1 + "11)
> 0 (21)
with X1  "11 ("v   2)+ s"11 (1 + 2) (1 + "11), X2  (1  s) (1 + "11) 
"11 and X3  (2   "v) (1  ) + "11 (2 + 1).
In this model, lt is an independently non-predetermined variable, this means
that the steady state is locally indeterminate if and only if both eigenvalues are
located within a unit circle, i.e., 1,2 2 ( 1; 1). Using the fact that the trace
T and the determinant D are respectively the sum and the product of the
eigenvalues, then local indeterminacy requires that D < 1 and T < 1 +D.
Therefore, we study analytically the conditions where the above inequalities
are satised using the following parameters , "11, , 2 and "v. As previously
dened that  is the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, "11 is the elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption,  is the propensity to save (saving over
after-tax labor income), 2 is the elasticity of marginal after-tax income, "v is
the elasticity of labor supply.
We present the critical values for 2, "11, ,  and "v in Appendix (B). Our
main results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given that  > max

; D
	
and  <  together with As-
sumptions 1  4, local indeterminacy emerges at the following conditions:
1.  1 < "11 < "
D
11 for all "v and 2 < 
D
2 .
2. "D11 < "11 < 0 with either "v < "
D
v , all 2 or "v > "
D
v and 2 < 
D
2 .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Mainly, Proposition (2) states that endogenous uctuations require a su¢-
ciently low elasticity of capital-labor substitution and high saving rates. More-
over, the presence of high progressive taxations (2 is su¢ciently low) enforces
the appearance of indeterminacy.
6 Discussions
In order to complete the characterization of economic stability, we provide the
economic interpretations for local indeterminacy and show how the presence of
progressive tax inuences the appearance of endogenous cycles.
Before going through the economic intuition, we need to do the follow-
ing computations: using (8) and the elasticity of interest rate k0 (k) = (k) =
  (1  s) =, we get:
@Rt+1
Rt+1
=  
1  s

@Kt+1
Kt+1
,
@Rt+1
Rt+1
=
1  s

@Lt+1
Lt+1
(22)
@lt
lt
=
1 + 2
"v   2
@wt
wt
,
@lt
lt
=
1 + "11
"v   2
@Rt+1
Rt+1
(23)
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The model of Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004) is recovered by setting zero labor
income taxes, i.e., 2 = 0. The objective of this section is to show how a high
tax progressivity promotes indeterminacy. Endogenous uctuations arise due
to the presence of interaction of two conicting e¤ects on savings that operate
through wages and real interest rate.
Let us start by the Benchmark model where 2 = 0. Assume at time t an
instantaneous increase in current capital stock Kt from its steady state. This
generates two opposite e¤ects through wages and interest rate: an increase in
Kt implies a rise in the wage income, and according to (23), agents supply more
labor. Given the budget constraint of young agents (2), a rise in wage income
implies a rise in Kt+1.
The second e¤ect is the anticipation e¤ect that plays in the opposite direction
in the sense that a higher Kt+1 is followed by a decline in the interest rate
Rt+1. Given that (@lt=lt) = (@Rt+1=Rt+1) = (1 + "11) ="v, then a decrease in
Rt+1 is followed by a decline in the labor supply and according to the budget
constraint, a low accumulation of capital Kt+1 occurs. A cyclical path emerges
whenever anticipation e¤ect dominates current e¤ect. This setting requires a
su¢ciently low elasticity of capital-labor substitution  as shown in (22) and a
low elasticity of marginal disutility of labor "v as shown in (23). Indeed, equality
(23) shows that the interest rate has a strong inuence on current labor supply
for su¢ciently high elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
In the presence of a progressive tax11 , equation (23) shows that a higher
progressivity (2  !  1) implies a lower elastic labor supply to both expected
interest rate and real wage. In particular, when 2 is close enough to  1, wages
do not have any inuence on labor supply (see (23)). As a result, this makes the
anticipation e¤ect more dominant than the current e¤ect and so deterministic
cycles are more likely to appear. Therefore, progressive taxes act as a desta-
bilizing factor. This result is reasonable because introducing progressive taxes
on labor income can stabilize wage income only. However, this is not enough
to stabilize future consumptions since the latter depends on the capital real
returns.
Above results are almost similar to those obtained by Chen and Zhang
(2009a) with linear tax policy. Conversely, D-P (2006) consider a model where
agents can consume only in the second period and save in the rst period. They
demonstrate that progressive taxation of capital income performs as a stabi-
lizer factor. Intuitively, our results are in line with Dromel and Pintus in the
sense that tax progressivity does not perform as a stabilizer if consumptions are
partially nanced by a non-taxed capital income.
Finally, in order to study the e¤ect of the saving rate on steady state stability,
consider the bifurcation value of  =  given by (30) in the Appendix and
di¤erentiate it with respect to , we obtain
@
@
=
(1  s) (1 + "11)
"11
"11 + 2   "v
"v   2   "11 (2 + 1)
> 0 (24)
11Notice that the presence of a progressive tax implies that 
2
declines from 0 to  1.
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Therefore, a higher saving rate makes the emergence of local indeterminacy
more likely. This result is analogous to Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004) after
setting 2 = 0. Therefore, in their model, the necessary condition for local
indeterminacy becomes  < C;P with
C;P   
s+ (1 + "11) ((1  s)    1)
"11
The positivity of C;P requires a su¢ciently high saving rate, that is,  >
C;P with C;P  (1 + "11   s) = (1 + "11) (1  s). Additionally, one can easily
nd that C;P < s and @

C;P =@ > 0. Thus, endogenous uctuations neces-
sitate a low elasticity of input substitution (complementary inputs) and a high
propensity to save.
7 A numerical illustration
In this example, we present numerically the analytical results obtained in Propo-
sition (2). To do that, consider the following explicit formulas for the production
function, the preference and the after-tax income function respectively:
y = Af (k) = A

sk  + (1  s)
 1=
(25)
u (x) =
x1 "
1  "
and v (l) =
l1+{
1 + {
with x =
c
B
; d (26)
' (wtlt) = (wtlt)
1+2 (27)
with A > 0 is the a scaling parameter, s 2 (0; 1), 2 2 ( 1; 0), " 2 (0; 1),
{ > 0 and  >  1 with  6= 0, n = 0:5175 and  = 0:3. Further, one can easy
show that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is 1= (1 + ), the elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption is "11 =  " < 0 which is the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption  1=", the elasticity of
marginal labor supply is simply "v = { and the rst-order elasticity of after-tax
income is 1 + 2 2 (0; 1).
Given the normalized steady state (k; l) = (1; 1) then, capital share in total
income does not depend on the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, thus s 2
(0; 1). Let us set s = 1=3, then according to Proposition (2) one can show that
the critical value "D11 =  1=2. Consistent with case (1) of Proposition (2), choose
" = 0:55 and { = 1 we obtain D2 =  0:55. Therefore, consider 2 =  0:8,
we can easily compute the lower bound of the propensity to save values D =
0:444 44 and  = 0:732 15. Since  > max

D; 
	
, then choose  = 0:74, we
get  = 5: 267 3 10 3. This model has a one predetermined variable, so that,
indeterminacy appears if and only if both eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix (19)
belong to a unit cycle, i.e., 1; 2 2 (0; 1). Therefore, setting  = 0:005, we show
that endogenous cycles emerge for above critical values with 1 = 0:994 19 2
(0; 1) and 2 = 0:604 11 2 (0; 1). Finally, given the above values, we compute
the scaling parameter value A = 12: 134 > A = 12: 071 which is necessary for
normalizing the steady state.
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Concerning the case (2) of Proposition (2), choose " =  0:4 we obtain
that "Dv = 0:2. Choose again "v = 0:1 and 2 =  0:5, we can compute that
D = 0:458 33 and  = 0:716 67. Thus, set  = 0:72 we deduce the upper
bound of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution  = 4: 166 7  10 3, as a
result, for  = 0:004, endogenous cycles appear with eigenvalues: 1 = 0:998 72
and 2 = 0:637 39 and the scaling parameter A = 6: 214 5 > 3: 454 2 = A.
The second conditions of case (2) are "v > "
D
v together with 2 < 
D
2 . Let us
set "v = 0:8, then we get 
D
2 =  0:333 33. Therefore, choose 2 =  0:7, then the
saving rate values are D = 0:45 and  = 0:789 47. If we consider  = 0:8, then
 = 1:234 6  10 2, so that, indeterminacy is obtained for  = 0:01 with the
eigenvalues: 1 = 0:971 81 and 2 = 0:578 82 with A = 9: 920 4 > 6: 023 6 = A.
According to above numerical example, it is shown that local indetermi-
nacy is obtained for non-plausible values of saving rate .12Moreover, one can
observe that endogenous cycles require a su¢ciently low elasticity of capital-
labor substitution close to the Leontief case. However, for realistic values of
consumption-wage ratio, around 65%, indeterminacy is no longer appear and
the equilibria is locally unique and converges to the steady state.
8 Conclusion
We have studied the e¤ect of a progressive labor-income tax policy on steady
state properties in an OLG model where agents can consume in both periods
(young and old). It is supposed separable preferences with respect to current-
period consumption, future-period consumption and labor supply. Agents have
to pay taxes related to their wage income. Further, the production function
exhibits a constant return-to-scale property. It is shown that progressive taxes
act as a destabilizing factor where it makes endogenous uctuation more likely.
Similar to previous literature, indeterminacy occurs for su¢ciently low elasticity
of factor substitution close to Leontief and non-realistic high values of youngs
saving rate.
9 Appendix
(A) Proof of Proposition 1. Proof. Consider (13) and (14) at the normal-
ized steady state (1; 1), we get:
v0 (1) =
1
B
u0

' (A! (1))  (1 + n)
B

A! (1)'0 (A! (1)) (28)
v0 (1) = u0 [A (1) (1 + n)]A (1)A! (1)'0 (A! (1)) (29)
Let us start with equality (29): LHS is a positive constant but the RHS is
either increasing or decreasing in A. If we denote the RHS as Q (A), then one
12The annual ratio of personal consumption expenditures over GDP have an average of 0.65
over the period (1959 - 2008) for US economy (see Economic Report of the President, 2008).
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can show that @Q (A) =@A = 1 + "11 + 2 + 1 which depends on A. Whenever
@Q (A) =@A > 0 (resp. < 0), then the RHS of (29) is strictly increasing (resp.
decreasing) in A. Moreover, the positivity of rst period consumption requires
A > A  ' 1 (1 + n) =! (1).
Let us rstly focus on the case where @Q (A) =@A > 0. In this case, the
existence of a value A that solves (29) requires the following boundary con-
ditions: limA!ARHS < v
0 (l) and limA!+1RHS > v
0 (l). Notice that if
@Q (A) =@A > 0 for all A, then A is unique.
However, when @Q (A) =@A < 0, the existence of A which solves (29) ne-
cessitates initially limA!ARHS > v
0 (l) and further limA!+1RHS < v
0 (l). If
@Q (A) =@A < 0 for all A, then A is unique.
Given A = A, then from (28), the LHS is a positive constant and the RHS is
decreasing in B according to Assumption 4. In addition, limB!0+ RHS = +1
and limB!+1RHS = 0
+, therefore, there exists a unique B > 0 that solves
(28).
Consequently, we have shown that there are unique A > A and B > 0
such that (k; l) = (1; 1) is a steady state of the system (11)-(12).
(B) Critical values. Here, we present the critical values of the model:
 
"11 (1 + 2) [s (1 + "v)  (1 + "11)] + (1  s) (1 + "11) [("v   2) (1  ) + "11]
"11 ["v   2   "11 (2 + 1)]
(30)
 
"11 (1 + 2) (1 + "11   s (1 + "v))  (1  s) (1 + "11) ("v   2)
("11 + 2   "v) (1  s) (1 + "11)
(31)
D 
s (1 + 2) (1 + "v)
(1  s) (1 + "11)
(32)
2   
"11s (1 + "v) + (1 + "11) ((1  s) "v   "11)
"11s (1 + "v)  (1 + "11) (1  s+ "11)
(33)
D2 
(1  s) (1 + "11)  s (1 + "v)
s (1 + "v)
(34)
"Dv 
(1  s) (1 + "11)  s
s
(35)
"D11 
2s  1
1  s
(36)
"11  s  1 (37)
(C) Proof of Proposition 2. Proof. In this proposition, we show that the
existence of endogenous uctuations requires D < 1 and T < 1 + D. Let us
begin with D < 1.
D < 1 if and only if  > D with D > 0. However, D < 1 is met if and
only if 2 < 
D
2 with 
D
2 >  1. Since 2 is the second-order elasticity, then it
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should always be negative, so D2 < 0 if and only if "v > "
D
v . One has to be
sure that "Dv is positive, a direct inspection implies that for "
D
v > 0 if and only
if "11 > "
D
11.
As a result D < 1 for (1) "11 > "
D
11,  > 
D and either "v > "
D
v and 2 < 
D
2
or "v < "
D
v , for all 2 < 0. In addition, (2) D < 1 for "11 < "
D
11, 2 < 
D
2 and
 > D for all "v > 0.
Furthermore, T < 1+D if and only if  < . The latter inequality requires
 > 0 which is met for  >  with  < 1. The positivity of  requires that
 > 0 and this inequality is satised if and only if 2 < 

2. It is immediate to
verify that 2 > 0 for "11 > "

11 and 

2 < 0 for "11 < "

11. On the one hand,
when 2 > 0, then 
 > 0 for all 2 < 0.
As a result, T < 1 + D for  <  and  >  with "11 > "

11 for all
2 2 ( 1; 0) and all values of "v > 0. On the other hand, whenever "11 < "

11
then 2 2 ( 1; 0) always. As a result, T < 1 +D for  < 
, "11 < "

11 and for
all "v > 0 with either  > 
 and 2 < 

2 or  2 (0; 1) and 2 > 

2.
If we do the intersection between the conditions of D < 1 and those of
T < 1 + D and considering that "11 < "
D
11 and 
D
2 < 

2 for "11 < "

11, we get
the local indeterminacy conditions summarized in Proposition (2).
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